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Abstract 
Actor–network theory (ANT) began at the end of the 1970s as an attempt to 
account for scientific activity without distinguishing a priori between its so-called 
social and technical aspects. The concept of actor–network captures the idea that 
for any actor to act, many others must act as well. In other words, action is shared 
with a multitude of people and things – for, indeed, things play a part in our 
collective lives. Actors, whether individual or collective, whether human or not, 
are therefore a mystery whose constitution must be explained; they are not at all 
the obvious starting point of action. Those few premises have had a significant 
impact on some organizational communication scholars, in particular those 
interested in interorganizational networks and partnerships, in questions of 
agency, or in the ability of communication to constitute organizations. 
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Organizational communication has been influenced by many theoretical 
perspectives and research traditions. Many of them were not initially intended for 
the study of organizations, communication, or their relationship. In the same way, 
actor–network theory (ANT), which has been gaining traction in particular among 
scholars interested in the constitutive power of communication, began as a theory 
for the study of science and the work of scientists. In fact, as discussed below, it is 
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only recently that actor–network scholars have acknowledged the importance of 
communication, and the organizational relevance of their own theory. However, 
this lack of explicit attention to communication processes has not stopped 
organizational communication researchers from borrowing insights from ANT. 
For instance, some of them are exploring ANT’s suggestion that social entities do 
not pre-exist the joint work of a multitude of beings that brings them into 
existence and the ways in which that opens up new directions for organizational 
communication research. This idea, along with its reliance on a meticulous 
ethnographic methodology, has made ANT a powerful lens for the study of 
communication’s role in the constitution of organizations and other phenomena 
within and around organizations. 
 After an overview of ANT’s core ideas, this entry will review some of the 
uses of the theory in communication studies more broadly, before focusing on 
three particular applications of ANT in organizational communication: networks, 
nonhuman agency, and the link between communication and organizations. The 
entry concludes with a discussion of some of the most common critiques of ANT 
and future research directions in this area. 
 
Central tenets of ANT 
Offering an outline to actor–network theory is difficult, as it has taken several 
forms throughout the decades. Although it is now commonly used as an 
alternative sociological theory, ANT initially emerged as an approach to the study 
of science and scientific activity in Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1979) 
and then in Latour’s Science in Action (1987). Since then, ANT has been 
associated with a critique of conventional sociology, with works in the sociology 
of economics, in environmental theory, and in the philosophy of knowledge. A 
common thread through all of ANT’s incarnations is its insistence that any 
apparently single actor is already a network of many others that act as well. ANT 
borrows from French narrative theorist A. J. Greimas the term actant, by which it 
highlights the fact that the ability to act is not a feature of one’s nature (i.e., being 
a human, an object, or anything else), but rather a relational feature; said 
otherwise, an actant is anything that makes a difference in a situation. Although 
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many misinterpret actor–network theory as a theory of actors or actants embedded 
in a network, in fact it is a theory of actants as networks. 
 The development of actor–network theory was influenced by British 
sociologist of knowledge David Bloor’s call for a “strong programme” in the 
study of science and knowledge, according to which failure and success should be 
studied in the same terms, rather than supposing that scientific success is 
attributable to intrinsic scientific progress while failure is explained by “social” 
factors. For ANT scholars, this was interpreted as a call to refrain from taking 
shortcuts through social explanations; if any such things played a part in the 
success or failure of a scientific project, then that impact should be witnessed 
concretely in the work of the scientists and engineers. Latour’s colleague at the 
Paris Mines School, Michel Callon, first introduced the notion of actor–network 
while he was studying a 1980s project to create the first French electric car. The 
project was eventually abandoned, and Callon used the term actor–network to 
account for the plethora of heterogeneous elements (oil prices, political concerns, 
technical issues, etc.) that failed to align in favor of the project. The electric car, in 
that sense, could be an actant in its own right only inasmuch as it brought together 
and stabilized the many different actions and interests that allowed it to come into 
being. The notion of actor–network, hence, draws attention on the fact that a 
seemingly unitary and coherent actant is in fact the always-provisional 
stabilization of heterogeneous others that make it up. Action, in other words, is 
always mediated: one actant’s ability to act lies in the action of others. As Latour’s 
(1996) famous maxim goes: “when one acts, others proceed to action” (p. 237). 
 A key feature of actor–network theory is its agnosticism to the nature of 
the things, people, principles, etc., that contribute to the actant’s makeup and 
agency. ANT authors regularly resort to the word “heterogeneity” to point out that 
researchers must be careful not to hold assumptions about the nature and identity 
of the people and things that may play a part in any given action or situation, or 
about their alleged “intentionality.” Indeed, nonhumans (probably the theory’s 
signature notion) also make a difference, and ANT gives credit to any being, 
irrespective of its nature, that has an effect in the situation under study. ANT’s 
agnosticism is an extension of the notion of symmetry, in the sense that what is 
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technical and natural should be explained in the same terms as what is social or 
cultural. In practical terms, this means that researchers should refrain from 
switching theories according to what aspects of reality they describe; rather, they 
should “follow the actors,” whose reality consists in a ceaseless hybridization of 
so-called social, technical, natural, and other elements. Said otherwise, the work 
of “purifying” reality into neat categories is that of (some) researchers, not that of 
the people who actually deal with the world on a daily basis. 
 Yet, actor–networks, in most cases, seem to be simple and unitary; or, 
following the theory’s jargon, they are black boxed. This expression captures the 
idea that we experience many of the objects – but also people – we interact with 
only to the extent that they provide us with some expected output. For instance, 
the computer screen displays my word processor file; the woman at the grocery 
store scans the item I want to buy; the street light turns green after a short while. 
Otherwise, they are opaque to us: it is only when there are breakdowns that we 
become aware of the vast network of electronic pieces, wires, lightbulbs, training, 
emotions, etc., that is involved in the smooth running of each of those seemingly 
simple “things.” ANT stresses that this apparent seamlessness and smoothness is 
the outcome of complex interactions and much labor, rather than the natural state 
of facts. For ANT, the process of reopening black boxes is not only a practical 
issue facing actors – for instance when minority employees attempt to resist well 
established managerial practices and tools – but also a methodological challenge 
for researchers. ANT studies look for ways of revealing the generative intricacies 
that constitute and stabilize technical and social reality. One common strategy, for 
instance, is to focus on moments of sociotechnical controversy, when networks are 
interrupted and when their composition becomes problematic again. For instance, 
in Acting in an Uncertain World, Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe (2009) studied 
the controversy over mad cow disease to show the limits of delegative democracy, 
which makes assumptions about the way our societies are constituted and 
excludes the technical and scientific aspects of our collective lives. Another way 
of opening up the black box of actor–networks consists in following ongoing 
projects, either in real time or after the fact through historical and documentary 
evidence. It is in that sense that actor–network theory has proved powerful to 
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analyze the construction not only of scientific facts or technology, but also of 
collectives, organizations, and other social groupings. This foray of ANT into 
social theory is justified given that, through the notion of actor–network, it has 
always acknowledged action’s collective character. An innovation of ANT’s social 
theory is, precisely, its refusal to speak of an already present society, or of pre-
existing structures. For ANT, for instance, there is “no group, only group 
formation” (Latour, 2005, p. 27). Collectives, structures, and organizations must 
be accounted for from the perspective of the “flat land” of interactions, that is, 
from observable actions and encounters. Otherwise, if already structured 
institutions and social entities are invoked to explain collectives, those accounts 
run the risk of being tautological. 
 Of particular interest to communication scholars is actor–network theory’s 
insistence on a series of semiotic notions, which have led it to be either applauded 
or, on the contrary, criticized. For instance, one of the key concepts of actor–
network theory is that of “translation.” In fact, ANT is sometimes referred to as 
the sociology of translation. Translation consists in one particular actor (or a black 
boxed actor–network) being able to act as the spokesperson for the many others it 
manages to enroll in a particular program of action. The action of others, in other 
words, is carried out or expressed through the spokesperson who acts as the 
visible face or audible voice of the actor–network. Translation allows making the 
action of actor–network equivalent in other places or times, or at different orders 
of magnitude, for instance when a graph translates the action of invisible bacteria, 
or when an ethnographer writes about geographically or culturally faraway places. 
Translation, of course, is never perfect, and always includes an element of 
betrayal. This is why, for researchers, actor–networks need to be unfolded and 
revealed: the noisy and messy multitude is disciplined and kept tidy as long as its 
actions are translated into a neat and smooth running program of action. That 
being said, the spokesperson may be contested, and cracks may appear in the 
apparent unity of the actor–network. 
 Relatedly, ANT literature has insisted on the idea that a material artifact – 
for instance a piece of technology – is “inscribed” with a “script,” which means 
that the said artifact carries the more or less explicit intention of the engineers or 
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designers that conceived it. For instance, a seatbelt that automatically positions 
itself over the driver’s chest is inscribed with a certain sense of morality, that is, 
that drivers cannot be trusted with their own safety. There is a certain amount of 
controversy over whether notions such as inscription – but also related concepts, 
such as “circulation,” “mediators,” or “scripts,” as well as ANT’s reliance on A. J. 
Greimas’s narrative theory – are to be taken metaphorically, or literally. In other 
words, is ANT a theory of the action of humans and nonhumans, or rather a theory 
of the way that action may be described, written, and textually circulated? For 
example, although Latour conducted work on the rhetoric and semiotics of 
academic writing, and even though he has insisted on the need for a theory of 
enunciation, which may suggest that he is indeed interested in a more linguistic 
version of ANT, his British colleague John Law suggests “material-semiotic 
relationality” as the name for ANT’s underpinning assumptions about reality; 
here, however, “semiotic” should be understood to refer to the mutual definition 
and shaping of a given network’s elements, rather than a study of signs and 
meaning. Beyond hair splitting, how ANT uses this “semiotic” vocabulary 
matters, precisely, for the status it gives to materiality and its ability to have 
agency. It can therefore be said that ANT and communication seem to have a 
natural affinity, at least in sharing a common vocabulary, but the actual 
correspondence may be different depending on the role ANT gives to those terms, 
and to what version of material agency one is willing to admit. 
 The apparent alignment between ANT and communication is further 
complicated by the fact that the theory has not been explicitly looking at the 
specific role of communication, whether as a way of actualizing its many concepts 
(translation, inscription, mediation, etc.) in the negotiation of sociotechnical 
controversies, or in the construction of social entities. For instance, it was only in 
2008 that Latour first entered a dialogue with communication scholars as part of 
an International Communication Association preconference on organizational 
communication (see Latour, 2013), followed by a piece in the International 
Journal of Communication (Latour, 2011). If it took a little while for ANT to 
engage with communication, communication scholars, for their part, have shown 
interest in actor–network theory since the mid-1990s, and this is also true of 
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organizational communication researchers. In the next sections, we will take a 
look at the way communication studies more generally has borrowed from actor–
network theory before looking at the ways in which ANT has influenced more 
specifically the field of organizational communication. 
 
ANT and communication studies 
Given ANT’s origins in the study of science and technology, it is natural to find in 
its application to the field of communication a similar emphasis on technology, 
including new media. Indeed, several communication technology and new media 
researchers borrow from ANT. This is the case, for example, in the earlier work by 
new media and cyberculture scholar Thierry Bardini, where he used ANT’s 
notions of scripts to account for the way technology “inscribes” a particular 
understanding of its end user. For Bardini, ANT allowed a different perspective on 
the conception of technology, especially in the 1980s context, which was 
dominated by economic perspectives, including Marxism. The theory allowed a 
vision of the work of engineers that extended beyond considerations of progress, 
scientific breakthroughs, or economic viability; rather, the focus was on their 
actual work, including the concrete ways in which they could envision the usage 
of the technology they were designing. Interestingly, Bardini diverted from ANT 
in later writing. Siles and Boczkowski (2012), in a similar way, draw from ANT 
and similar theories to propose that the user generated content of new media plays 
a part in shaping the technology itself. Drawing on the notion of assemblage 
(which could be roughly equated to that of actor–network, even though it has a 
history of its own), they show that the technology, as a whole, extends beyond its 
materiality proper and includes its uses and the content that is created in those 
uses. What they call a “texto-material” approach allows fully acknowledging the 
user’s engagement with technology, rather than separating the technological 
conception of new media devices and platforms from their use. The object of 
study, here new media, is seen to be in the making – to be evolving as users and 
software change. 
 In parallel with a focus on technology proper, some researchers have 
concentrated on sociotechnical controversies from communicational perspectives. 
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This is the case, for example, of Benoit-Barné (2009), who studied “material 
recalcitrance” through the example of a hydroelectric dam – along with its various 
technical features that measure water levels – that would not let itself be defined 
by a power company’s official discourse (about an alleged imminent drought), 
thus contradicting it. Her study constitutes a potent example of nonhuman agency 
in sociotechnical controversies, as it shows that human discourse may be 
contradicted by nonhuman action. Besel (2011), for his part, showed how a 
particular graph in a controversy regarding climate change became “black boxed” 
by some, that is, perceived as nonproblematic and natural, while others – climate 
change skeptics – attempted to reopen that black box. Besel’s account of the 
events illustrates ANT’s argument over the need for important resources to reopen 
black boxed facts and technologies, and reveal again the intricacies of the actor–
network. 
 ANT has also found its way into studies of journalism, where it has been 
useful in accounting for journalists’ changing work practices, in particular with 
respect to technology. The theory allows embracing the heterogeneity of 
journalistic work and recognizing the many things that make a difference in that 
field. For instance, Rodgers (2015) has studied the way the technical details of a 
piece of software – a Toronto, Canada newspaper’s content management system – 
play an important part in the work of newsroom personnel and in their ability to 
deliver timely news. Rodgers argued that, contrary to official accounts and to 
studies that limit their scope to the “effects” of technology, the system’s 
development is ongoing and is intertwined with organizational logics, as the 
system, rather than being unitary, is an actor–network comprising different 
components as well as their different uses in various portions of the corporation. 
ANT allows the author to delve into the system’s “messy” history, rather than 
sticking to coherent after-the-fact narratives. Actor–network theory, indeed, allows 
stressing that boundaries are blurry and the result of the stabilization of an actor–
network. 
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ANT and organizational communication 
Although communication theory more broadly has mostly borrowed from ANT’s 
discussions of technology and of the heterogeneity of action, organizational 
communication has embraced a wider array of the theory’s notions, and it has 
done so in more varied ways. In particular, it has appropriated ANT’s original 
treatment of the concept of networks. Organizational communication has also 
more exhaustively showed the diverse spectrum of nonhumans that may be at play 
in organizations, in addition to technology. More importantly, some studies have 
relied on ANT to bridge the gap between communication and organization, and 
show how interaction and communication “scale up” to constitute the collectives 
that we call organizations. In doing so, they have revealed the power of actor–
network theory for the study of the communicative constitution of organizations 
(CCO): how documents, notes, emails, whiteboards, slide presentations, and other 
“technologies” contribute to organizing processes in their ability to carry speech 
(and the deeds that are accomplished through speech) through time and space, 
which allows communication to act beyond the specific situation of its production. 
The work of adapting ANT to organizational communication, and in particular to 
CCO, was helped by the fact that actor–network theories had already pointed out 
that social entities are not just floating out there, but require their very existence to 
be explained from the minutiae of everyday (inter)actions. Many organizational 
communication scholars therefore found in ANT not only a theory of nonhuman 
agency, but also a theory of the social that could, to some extent at least, serve as a 
basis for their theorizing. 
 
Networks 
As mentioned earlier, the notion of “network” in ANT takes on a particular 
meaning: it is not a theory of people or things connected in networks (say, 
telecommunication networks, or social networks), but rather a theory of actants as 
networks. In other words, it puts the emphasis on the fact that any action is 
already shared with others. However, that sharing may (but does not have to) take 
the form of a concrete network, in the more conventional sense of the word. The 
presence of the word “network” in the theory’s name has led some to privilege 
Actor-Network Theory 10 
studying this sharing of action within such conventional networks, including 
interorganizational networks. For instance, LaVigne (2003) used actor–network 
theory to document the creation of a homeless information management system in 
New York State and its correlative constitution of a network of hitherto weakly 
linked organizations and agencies. The system not only described existing 
relationships between funding agencies, nonprofit organizations, shelters, 
childcare services, and many others, but also created new relations among them 
(for instance, in establishing a duty to report on their activities) and with the 
state’s homeless population. The unique ANT flavor of LaVigne’s study lies in the 
fact that the computer system creates the network that it claims to describe: in 
other words, technology has organizing properties in its ability to relate people, 
shelters, agencies, and programs together. Similar studies have been conducted, 
for example in studying the constitution of interorganizational networks that exist 
to provide health services to various clienteles or to exchange strategic data 
between businesses and institutions, or in establishing research and development 
partnerships. Actor–network theory is particularly resorted to when the network 
under study is constituted through technological means: for instance, online 
advertisers are united in a formal association, but also through the sharing of 
online behavior tracking technologies (Beck, 2015). To a large extent, the actor–
network theory literature proper also provides examples of interorganizational 
networks and their communication practices surrounding technological 
challenges: this is the case with Callon and Law’s (1992) study of the many 
organizations and government agencies involved in the (aborted) project of 
designing a British military aircraft. 
 
Nonhuman agency 
One of the concepts from actor–network theory that organizational 
communication has put to the greatest use is that of nonhuman agency. This has 
been done through an acknowledgement of the role of technology in 
organizational settings, but also through a broader recognition that agency is not 
limited to human beings, but is shared with, among others, documents and 
numbers. On the technological front Taylor and Van Every (1993) used Callon and 
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Latour’s discussion of translation to account for the way technology and 
materiality provided durability and visibility to the organizational “macro-actor.” 
The macro-actor is not of a different “level” than other beings; it is not “larger” or 
more encompassing than so-called individuals. Rather, it is a horizontal 
assemblage of these individuals, with a spokesperson who provides them with the 
ability to act and speak collectively. More recently scholars have recognized ANT 
as a candidate theory to account for technological change and its contribution to 
the constitution of organizations, as well as the role in coordination practices of 
technology’s and humans’ shared agency (see, e.g., the work of Paul Leonardi). In 
other words, ANT allows accounting for the way the heterogeneity of information 
technology grants its homogeneity to organizations. 
 In addition to technology, organizational communication scholars have 
also acknowledged the contribution of other forms of nonhuman agency. In 
particular, there has been a focus on what has been named “textual agency,” that 
is, the ability of texts of all kinds – documents, contracts, procedures, flyers – to 
make a difference in situations. For instance, Cooren (2004) gives the example of 
a note: a worker can say that she reminded herself of something with a note, but it 
is equally true to say that it is the note that reminded her of something. Deciding 
which part of the worker–note hybrid really acts is a matter of debate, rather than 
an intrinsic property of action. A similar argument was made in  Brummans’s 
(2007) poignant work regarding a euthanasia declaration and its contribution to 
decisions regarding end-of-life treatments. 
 Though not involving documents as such, other examples of nonhuman 
agencies include the various ways in which things are measured in organizations. 
Accounting and various budgeting practices, when looked at with an ANT 
friendly lens, prove to be not only quantitative descriptions of organizational 
processes, but also constitutive of those processes. Accounting, by ensuring that 
equivalence is maintained throughout temporal and spatial chains of inscriptions, 
also allows organizational constitution and (tele-)action. The work of Bertrand 
Fauré and that of Paolo Quattrone are examples of ANT inspired research on 
numbers in organizations. Besides accounting, literature has also identified how 
ANT allows recognizing other effects of numbers in organizations: for instance, a 
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measuring stick that decides which children receive nutritional care in a Doctors 
Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) camp (Cooren & Matte, 2010) or a 
table drawn on a blackboard that indicates whether children are sick (Cooren & 
Bencherki, 2010). 
 
The link between communication and organization 
Actor–network theory is central to a certain number of perspectives in 
organizational communication that claim that communication is constitutive of 
organizations. ANT, indeed, allows stressing the way materiality (including 
technology, documents, etc.) allows the passage from singular and ephemeral 
episodes of communication to apparently larger and stable organizations – what 
the organizational communication literature refers to as “scaling up.” Thanks to 
the contribution of material things in organization, communication can leave its 
context of production and act elsewhere and at another time, and thus weave 
together space and time. 
 An original import from ANT into organizational communication is a 
focus on action, rather than people, as the unit of analysis. Indeed, as Barbara 
Czarniawska (2004) suggests, organizations may be better understood as action 
nets that are woven together through narratives. In particular, Latour draws on 
Greimas’s concept of “programs of action” to account for the way different 
actants may pursue aims that translate each other into a common collective action. 
In our field, this has led to the suggestion that the imbrication of programs of 
action corresponds to the incorporation of individual narratives into an 
organizational metanarrative or into an authoritative text (Kuhn, 2008). 
 ANT inspired approaches have also explored the ways in which material 
entities, including texts, have organizing – but also disorganizing – effects. This 
idea is based on earlier work by Taylor and colleagues on the idea that 
organizations are constituted through an interplay of text and conversation. Text, 
the argument goes, stabilizes conversations, which in turn allow giving a voice to 
texts in the current situation. Although Taylor and others suggested the idea as 
early as 1996, its influence is still felt today. More recently, Latour’s notion of 
“matters of concern” has been used in organizational communication to account 
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for the way things – issues, objects, documents, etc. – may become active again in 
the current interactional scene (see, e.g., Cooren et al., 2015). Indeed, the notion 
highlights the idea that one of the ways in which “facts” – for instance a particular 
strategic threat – act is by being expressed as concerns and picked up by others as 
such in conversation. 
 Even though it is always delicate to sort researchers into schools and 
traditions, it is probably accurate to describe many of the people who have been 
mentioned so far as (loosely) belonging to what has been called the Montreal 
School of organizational communication, which shares with other approaches the 
view that communication is constitutive of organizations. The originality of the 
Montreal School lies in part in borrowing from ANT its focus on the role of 
materiality in the constitution of the social, meaning that documents, technologies 
and other “things” – including meeting minutes, sticky notes, whiteboards, emails, 
and many others – help our conversations endure and carry them to other places 
and other times. This means that material things of all kinds allow our decisions, 
plans, judgments, forecasts, and other language acts to have effects in other places 
and at other times. Recognizing the role of material things in the constitution of 
our organizations has led Montreal School researchers to refer to the latter as 
“plenums of agencies.” 
 
ANT critiques and future research directions 
It is interesting and perhaps indicative of actor–network theory’s fit with 
organizational communication that very few critiques of ANT come from within 
our discipline. Critiques that have been formulated elsewhere, however, may be 
relevant for organizational communication scholars and hint at possible future 
directions for students and researchers. 
 A first, classical critique of ANT is that it is unable to think critically about 
the realities it describes. Said otherwise, it is not interested in power related 
issues, or in the historical conditions of power. For instance, ANT has been 
accused of accounting for the formation of networks, but failing to explain their 
dynamics once they are formed and their effect on the distribution of power. ANT 
friendly perspectives, it is said, omit reflection on the consequences of technology, 
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as well as on the structural and cultural contexts where it is constructed. This 
omission of power issues may come from ANT’s theory of agency, which ascribes 
agency to people and things essentially, without questioning that capacity to act – 
even though, the critique goes, agency is made possible by all sorts of social 
factors that ANT disregards. Interestingly, although many have raised concerns 
over ANT’s lack of attention to issues of power, others have accused it of the 
exact opposite: science, knowledge, and pretty much anything else become the 
battleground of opposing agencies, with no real truth to be found, as 
Amsterdamska pointed out in a widely cited article unambiguously titled “Surely 
You Are Joking, Monsieur Latour!” (1990). Rather than regretting such a 
“political ontology,” Alcadipani and Hassard (2010) point out that ANT’s 
explanation of the way things are “assembled into being” (p. 423) provides the 
potential to “de-naturalize” the organizations and collectives that we take for 
granted. In other words, ANT warns against the trap of assuming that the way we 
organize our shared lives and labor is the only possible way. Latour himself notes 
that for ANT, power is not something that serves to explain reality; on the 
contrary, the theory is interested in understanding how power is done, without 
presuming who or what has power. In other words, for ANT, power should be 
studied in actu, that is, in its actual performance. 
 Other critics have taken issue with the role ANT gives to nonhuman 
“actors” in the name of the “general symmetry” it calls for. This is connected to 
the issue of intentionality, as well as to related questions of human dignity and of 
what should deserve to be called an “action.” ANT, it is said, denies the fact that 
only humans can transform society, that only such acts deserve to be called 
actions. It may be correct that humans interact with nonhumans, but both types of 
agency cannot be analyzed in the same terms. More vehement attacks include 
accusations of a return to hylozoism (the belief that inanimate objects are alive). 
The argument against ANT revolves around the notion of intentionality, that is, 
whether action should be willful; answering yes to the question amounts to 
limiting agency to humans. This argument also comes from within organizational 
communication; in particular, questions arise regarding whether nonhuman 
agency can be meaningful (McPhee & Seibold, 1999). McPhee, and more 
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generally the “four flows” tradition of CCO, follow Giddens’s structuration 
theory, where agency supposes not only intentionality but also reflexivity and 
contextual knowledge, which prevent the attribution of action to nonhumans. 
Furthermore, agency for Giddens (1993) is not only to have acted in some way, 
but also to possess the capacity to “have acted otherwise” (p. 81), which implies a 
form of decision or choice, which has no correspondence in ANT. 
 Another issue that has been raised with respect to ANT, as reported in 
Bardini (2007), is that of its ambiguous relation with reflexivity. Indeed, ANT’s 
program to show that science and technology are practical achievements is 
imperfectly applied to ANT scholars’ own descriptions of their observations. How 
that could be achieved without a sort of infinite regression is not yet settled and 
deserved further consideration. Although some scholars find a solution in 
adopting writing practices that highlight their own uncertainties and limitations, 
others straightforwardly reject the need for them to be reflexive about their own 
research. 
 A last critique concerns the “semiotic” character of ANT, as has already 
been described above (see Bardini, 2007). Indeed, by using – whether 
metaphorically or otherwise – a language borrowed from semiotics, and in 
particular from Greimas’s narrative theory, ANT runs the risk of reducing 
everything to text and to “scripts.” Rather than studying materiality and the role of 
technology, for instance, the theory may very well be studying their description in 
talk, or the written procedures that are inscribed in/on them. This critique is of 
particular relevance to us here, as it has been extended to include the Montreal 
School of CCO, whose members, the argument goes, by drawing on the notion of 
matters of concern, have been studying materiality only to the extent it is 
“textualized” through its evocation as a concern to participants in meetings and 
interactions. 
 Finally, with some exceptions, the relationship between ANT and 
organizational communication has been mostly one way. However, there are many 
avenues for organizational communication, and perhaps CCO in particular, to 
contribute to ANT in return. For instance, CCO, as an alternative take on 
organizations, is in a good position to formulate just the kind of critical insight 
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that could feed back into ANT and serve as a response to those who believe the 
theory lacks the ability to tackle issues of power. Indeed, by viewing 
organizations, factories, and other workplaces as continuous achievements, rather 
than stable and fixed entities, CCO scholars may provide ANT with the means to 
show its ability to question the taken-for-granted character of work relations, 
including power relations, especially to the extent that materiality may play a part 
in constituting and stabilizing those relations. As organizational communication 
continues to borrow from ANT, it will need to provide answers to the critiques 
with which the latter has had to deal. For instance, should our discussions of 
organizations give privilege to human intentionality and dignity? How can we 
reconcile our interest for the role of technology with an original treatment of 
power issues? These, and many other questions, are not only deterrents to but also 
exciting opportunities for creative organizational communication research moving 
forward. Recent work in organizational communication is already suggestive of an 
engagement with materiality beyond its “textualization” (see Putnam, 2015, on the 
discourse–materiality relationship). In the same vein, continuing our engagement 
with ANT and related theories may also lead us to reconsider what we mean by 
communication: attempting to include nonhumans in the equation may be an 
opportunity to devise a theory of (organizational) communication that is not 
limited to human language. Furthermore, organizational communication research 
may want to consider ANT not only in terms of technology or materiality, but also 
– and perhaps more importantly – as a theory of shared agency, as its very name 
suggests. Indeed, ANT scholars have been insisting that the human/nonhuman 
divide does not hold, and yet in our interpretation of the theory, we have reified 
the divide more than ever. Approaching ANT from the idea that agency is shared 
may help us reconsider issues of organizational action, membership, belonging, 
and other situations where the locus of agency is contested or confused, without 
splitting the world into any given categories in advance. 
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